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because the Supreme Court had twice 
held that proceedings for the issuance of 
search warrants are not open. Id. (citing 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 
(1978); United States v. United States 
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972». 
Although the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue in reference to the public, the 
court of appeals stated that "the common 
sense reason why proceedings for search 
warrants are not open to the public 
convinces us that the same principles 
apply when the press seeks disclosure." 
Id. 
After rejecting the Sun's claim of a first 
amendment right of access, the court ex-
amined the press's common law right of 
access. The court held that at common 
law the press and the public have a quali-
fied right to judicial records. Id. at 65 
(relying on Nixon v. Warner Communi-
cations, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 
(1978». "Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 41 (g) facilitates observance of this 
right by directing the judicial officer to 
file all papers relating to the search war-
rant in the clerk's office." Id. 
The court held that "the common law 
qualified right of access to warrant pa-
pers is committed to the sound discre-
tion of the judicial officer who issued the 
warrant." Id. The court noted that an 
abuse of discretion standard applied to 
the judicial officer's decision. When 
someone seeks to inspect sealed papers, 
the judicial officer may deny access if 
sealing is "essential to preserve higher 
values and is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest." Id. at 65-66 (quotingPress-
Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 
501,510 (1984». In the instant case, the 
magistrate and the district court both 
decided that the public interest in the 
investigation of crime outweighed the 
Sun's interest in publishing the affidavit. 
However, the court of appeals noted that 
"conclusory assertions are insufficient to 
allow review; specificity is required." Id. 
at 66. Moreover, the district court failed 
to examine the affidavit. Id. 
Upon denying access to sealed papers, 
the judicial officer must consider alterna-
tives. "This ordinarily involves disclosing 
some of the documents or giving access 
to a redacted version." Id. In the instant 
case, the magistrate complied by unseal-
ing the warrants and the returns. How-
ever, the district court erroneously de-
clined the government's offer to disclose 
a redacted version of the affidavit. Id. 
The court of appeals resolved what was 
an ongoing dispute between the press 
and the government. By recognizing the 
Sun's common law right of access to the 
affidavit, the court broadened the free-
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dom of speech and granted greater privi-
leges to the press. No longer can a judi-
cial officer rely on the government's 
position and summarily seal warrant 
papers. Rather, the judicial officer must 
exercise independent judgment in 
reaching such a decision. 
-Richard E. Guida 
Kosmas v. State: UNSOLICITED 
STATEMENT BY WITNESS 
INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO TAKE 
LIE DETECTOR TEST 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland re-
cently reversed a defendant's murder 
conviction "because the introductien of 
evidence that he refused to take a lie 
detector examination prejudiced his case 
beyond the point that an instruction to 
disregard the testimony reasonably 
could be expected to effect a cure." 
Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587, 589, 560 
A.2d 1137,1138 (1989). In so ruling, the 
court of appeals reversed the court of 
special appeals. Moreover, this case re-
flects the continuing trend in Maryland 
that evidence of a defendant's refusal to 
submit to a lie detector exam is inadmis-
sible and remains inadmissible even if it 
is the result of a witness's unsolicited 
"blurt out." 
Stanley Kosmas suspected his wife 
Maria was committing adultery. He hired 
a private detective, retired Baltimore City 
police sergeant Edward Mattson, to fol-
low her. In early 1985, Mattson discov-
ered Maria and her employer in a hotel 
room. Two months later, Kosmas saw his 
wife with the same man in her car. In De-
cember, 1985, Maria was discovered 
murdered within a mile of her home. 
The eldest of the Kosmas children tes-
tified that his father subjected Maria to 
verbal and physical abuse and that Kos-
mas once threatened to kill her if she left 
him.Id. at 590, 560A.2dat 1139. Mattson 
testified that Kosmas offered him 
$10,000 to murder Maria. Id. Kosmas, 
who had an excellent reputation in his 
business and home communities, denied 
these allegations. 
The case turned on Mattson's testi-
mony at trial. He testified that on Decem-
ber 20th, Maria had been missing for four 
days. That morning he went to the defen-
dant's home where he found a detective 
interviewing Kosmas. While Mattson was 
on the stand, the prosecutor asked him if 
he heard the content of the conversation 
between Kosmas and the detective. 
Mattson responded that it was "[iJust the 
typical police interview" in' which the 
detective asked Kosmas if he had seen his 
wife or knew of her whereabouts. Id. at 
592, 560 A.2d at 1140. The prosecutor 
next asked Mattson, "[a)nd then you 
talked to the defendant?" Id. Mattson 
replied, "[t)hen I talked to [Kosmas) .... 
I said, 'Would you take a lie detector?' He 
said no." [d. The defendant's attorneys 
immediately requested a mistrial. The 
trial judge denied the motion, then in-
structed the jury to ignore any testimony 
concerning a lie detector test. Id. at 591-
92, 560 A.2d at 1139-40. 
The court of appeals first noted that 
evidence that the defendant refused to 
submit to a lie detector test was inadmis-
sible. Id. at 592-93, 560 A.2d at 1140. 
Having established this premise, the 
court concentrated on the damage done 
to the defendant by the inadmissible evi-
dence and the extent to which the jury 
instruction cured this damage. Id. at 594, 
560 A.2d at 1141. As a result, the precise 
question before the court was "whether 
the prejudice to the defendant was so 
substantial that he was deprived of a fair 
trial." Id. at 595, 560 A.2d at 1141. 
The recent decision of Guesfeird v. 
State, 300 Md. 653, 480 A.2d 800 (1984), 
established factors to help answer this 
question. These factors include: 
whether the reference to a lie detec-
tor was repeated or whether it was a 
single, isolated statement; whether 
the reference was solicited by coun-
sel, or was an inadvertent and unre-
sponsive statement; whether the wit-
ness making the reference is the 
principal witness upon whom the 
entire prosecution depends; wheth-
er credibility is a crucial issue; 
whether a great deal of other evi-
dence exists; and whether an infer-
ence as to the result of the test can be 
drawn. 
Kosmas, 316Md.at594, 560A.2dat 1141 
(quoting Guesfeird, 300 Md. at 659,480 
A.2d at 803). 
The state emphasized that the lie detec-
tor test was mentioned only once and 
that this reference was unsolicited by the 
prosecutor. The court, however, re-
sponded that the state was not entirely 
blameless for this "blurt-out" because 
Mattson testified on behalf of the state. 
Id. at 595, 560 A.2d at 1141. The court 
suspected that Mattson's fifteen years as 
a police officer should have made him 
aware of the inadmissibility of his state-
ment. The court was also wary of 
Mattson's motives for disclosing this evi-
dence since he was once suspected for 
the murder. !d. at 595-96, 560 A.2d at 
1141-42. 
Nonetheless, the court was more con-
cerned with whether Kosmas' credibility 
was a crucial issue. The state's case de-
pended on circumstantial evidence that 
the defendant mistreated his wife and 
that he tried to put out a contract for her 
murder. The court said the evidence of 
Kosmas' refusal to take a lie detector test 
"cut to the heart of the defense." Id. at 
597, 560 A.2d at 1142. 
Finally, the curative effect of the jury 
instruction was addressed. Judge McAu-
liffe opined that the instruction was in-
sufficient to cure the substantial preju-
dice poisoning the jurors' opinion of 
the defendant. He relied on Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) to 
support this position. In that case, the 
Supreme Court said, "[t]here are some 
contexts in which the risk that the jury 
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is 
so great, and the consequences of failure 
so vital to the defendant, that the practi-
cal and human limitations of the jury 
system cannot be ignored." Kosmas, 316 
Md. at 597, 560 A.2d at 1143 (quoting 
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135). 
Accordingly, Kosmas v. State indicates 
that Maryland courts are becoming in-
creaSingly intolerant of any evidence that 
a defendant refused to take a polygraph 
exam. This case also warns prosecutors 
not to ask open-ended questions on di-
rect examination unless they are confi-
dent that the information solicited will 
not be substantially prejudicial to the 
defendant. 
-Gregory R. Smouse 
Wilson v. Morris: EVIDENCE OF 
PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT PATIENT 
MONITORING POLICIES IS 
ADMISSIBLE TO DEMONSTRATE 
THE STANDARD OF CARE 
In Wilson v. Morris, 312 Md. 284, 563 
A.2d 392 (1989), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that evidence of prior and 
subsequent procedures for transporting 
patients was relevant and admissible as a 
consideration of the required standard 
of care. Thus, the court of appeals af-
firmed the decision of the court of special 
appeals, which had remanded the case 
for a new trial. 
Irene Ragland, appellee, brought an 
action against a hospital director and a 
county health department receptionist 
as a result of personal injuries sustained 
while she was a patient in the Western 
Maryland Adult Day Care Treatment 
Center ("the Center''). Wilson, 312 Md. 
at 287,563 A.2d at 393. Ragland was re-
turning from a doctor's office adjacent to 
the Center when Ann G. Wilson, the re-
ceptionist, temporarily left Ragland unat-
tended in a wheelchair at the top of a 
handicapped access ramp. When the 
wheelchair rolled down the access ramp, 
Ragland fell forward on to the pedals and 
fractured two vertebrae. Approximately 
eighteen months prior to the accident, 
and again, beginning the day after the ac-
cident, the Center's policy was for an at-
tendant to remain with a patient while 
transporting the patient between the two 
facilities.Id. at 288, 563 A.2d at 393. At 
the time of the aCcident, however, the 
Center's policy was to have an attendant 
accompany the patient to and from the 
adjacent facility, but not to wait there 
during the course of treatment. Id. at 288 
n.5, 563 A.2d at 393 n.5. The trial court 
refused to admit the evidence of the 
Center's prior and subsequent practices 
and concluded that such evidence was 
irrelevant and inadmissible. Id. at 288, 
563 A.2d at 393. The court of special 
appeals reversed the trial court's ruling. 
The intermediate appellate court held 
that the Center's prior and subsequent 
procedures demonstrated a pattern of 
conduct which made those procedures 
relevant and admissible. Id. at 288, 563 
A.2d at 394 (citing Morris v. Wilson, 74 
Md. App. 663, 668,539 A.2d 1151, 1153-
54 (1988». 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari to consider the law 
under which evidence of prior and sub-
sequent practices is admissible to prove 
an alleged breach of the applicable stan-
dard of care. [d. at 289, 563 A.2d at 394. 
The issue concerning the admissibility 
of prior policy evidence was one of first 
impression in Maryland. Consequently, 
the court examined the case law of other 
jurisdictions. In Welsh v. Burlington N. 
R. R., 719 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. App. 1986), 
an injured employee provided evidence 
that a railroad company had abandoned 
a policy that supplied employees with 
carts for the purpose of loading propane 
tanks. The Missouri Court of Appeals 
held that the testimony regarding the 
previous use of the carts to load pro-
pane tanks was relevant and probative on 
the issue of whether the defendant was 
negligent in failing to provide reasonably 
safe employee equipment. Wilson, 317 
Md. at 292, 563A.2d at 396 (citing Welsh, 
719 S.W.2d at 797). In another case, a 
woman tripped and fell upon a store 
entrance floor mat. Id. (relying on Swiler 
v. Baker's Super Market, Inc., 277 
N.W.2d 697 (Neb. 1979». InSwiler, the 
evidence revealed that on wet and rainy 
days, it was the store owner's usual prac-
tice to tape the mat to the floor to protect 
against slipping. The Supreme Court of 
Nebraska ruled that the trial court prop-
eclyallowed the plaintiff to introduce evi-
dence relative to the store-owner's past 
practice of taping or securing the mat in 
question to the floor to prevent bulging. 
Wilson, 317 Md. at 294, 563 A.2d at 396 
(citingSwiler, 277 N.W.2d at 700). 
Applying the holdings in Welsh and 
Swiler, the court of appeals held the 
prior practice of the Center was relevant 
under the circumstances. [d. at 295, 563 
A.2d at 397. The court also found the 
evidence of the prior policy a material 
fact to be considered in analyzing 
whether the current policy was reasona-
bly safe or whether other methods could 
have been easily adopted. Id. Moreover, 
the court stated that the trial judge 
should consider the following test for de-
termining whether prior policies should 
be allowed as evidence: 
1) The remoteness in time of the 
prior policy; 
2) The degree and significance of 
the change in relation to the substan-
tive issues presented; 
3) The reasons for the change in 
policy; and 
4) The likelihood that any prejudi-
cial effect of the proffered evidence 
will outweigh the probative value of 
the evidence. 
Id. Thus, the court held that the Center's 
prior policy of remaining with patients 
taken for medical care was probative in 
revealing the Center's knowledge and 
perception of its duty to patients. [d. at 
294-95,563 A.2d at 397. 
Next, the court discussed whether 
subsequent policy evidence was admis-
sible to prove the scope of the duty of 
care owed to the plaintiff. The court 
recognized that there was "a standard of 
care exception" to the general rule ex-
cluding evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures when such evidence 
"provi~es circumstantial proof that the 
applicable standard of care had not been 
met at the time of the accident or other 
occurrence in question." [d. at 298, 563 
A.2d at 395 (quoting 51. McLain, Mary-
land Practice: Maryland Evidence § 407.1 
(1987, 1989 Supp.». The court's opin-
ion stated that although a jury should not 
consider the evidence of the immediate 
change in patient monitoring policies as 
an admission of negligence, it was admis-
sible as evidence of the standard of care 
required under the circumstances. Id. at 
301, 563 A.2d at 400. Therefore, the 
court ruled that the trial judge erred in 
precluding counsel from offering the 
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